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Dairy Policy Briefs 
 
To enhance understanding of dairy policy issues that will be considered as part of the 2012 Farm Bill 
debate, the Dairy Policy Analysis Alliance has prepared the attached set of one-page briefs. These briefs 
have a common format, first explaining a specific dairy program or concept and then outlining some 
related public policy issues. 
 
The sequence of papers is: 
 
#1 Price Volatility in Dairy Markets 
#2 Dairy Product Price Support Program 
#3 Milk Income Loss Contract Program 
#4 Voluntary Supply Management 
#5 Mandatory Supply Control 
#6 Dairy Farm Revenue Insurance 
#7 Dairy Trade Policy 
#8a Milk Marketing Orders: 
#8b Classification 
#8c Pricing 
#8d Pooling 
 
It is important to emphasize that these briefs provide simplified explanations of complex programs, 
necessarily omitting many details. Readers interested in more comprehensive coverage are encouraged 
to access a companion Dairy Policy Analysis Alliance paper, Dairy Policy Issues for the 2012 Farm Bill. 
This and other background papers and web sites can be electronically accessed/downloaded at either the 
FAPRI website (http://www.fapri.missouri.edu/) or at the University of Wisconsin Understanding Dairy 
Markets website (http://www.aae.wisc.edu/future/).  
 
If you have questions about the material in these briefing papers or would like additional information, 
please contact FAPRI or UW-Madison Alliance affiliates at the following phone numbers or email 
addresses: 
 
Scott Brown  (573)882-3861  brownsc@missouri.edu 
Bob Cropp  (608)262-9483  racropp@wisc.edu 
Brian W. Gould  (608)263-3212  bwgould@wisc.edu 
Ed Jesse  (608)262-6348  evjesse@wisc.edu 
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Dairy Policy Brief #1: Price Volatility in Dairy Markets 
 
What is the history behind milk price movements? 
 
Month to month changes in milk prices have increased dramatically in recent years. Concern over 
volatility includes not only the month to month price changes, but also the wider gaps between price 
peaks and troughs. In the 1970s, the largest monthly increase in all milk prices was $0.68/cwt in 
September, 1973. The largest decline was $-0.58/cwt in May, 1974. The Nixon price freeze of that 
decade, a short-term governmental policy to combat inflation, influenced these results. Over the decade, 
the highest monthly milk price was $12.90/cwt while the low was $5.37/cwt, a difference of $7.53. In the 
1980s, the largest monthly increase in milk prices of $0.80/cwt occurred in September, October and 
November, 1989 while the largest monthly decline of $-0.50/cwt occurred in March, 1989. The high 
monthly milk price during the 1980s was $16.00/cwt while the low was $11.30/cwt, a difference of $4.70.  
 
Monthly price changes became much larger in the 1990s. The largest monthly increase of $1.30/cwt 
occurred in September, 1998 while the largest monthly decline of $-2.60/cwt occurred in April, 1999. The 
highest monthly all milk price of the 1990s was $18.10/cwt while the lowest was $11.30/cwt, a difference 
of $6.80. Relatively sharp movements in milk prices continued in the decade of the 2000s, with the largest 
monthly increase in the all milk price of $2.60/cwt occurring in April 2004 and the largest monthly decline 
of $-2.20/cwt occurring in January, 2009. The highest monthly price in the decade of the 2000s of 
$21.90/cwt occurred in November, 2007 and the lowest monthly price of $11.00/cwt occurred in May-
June, 2003, a difference of $10.90. 
    
What are the key factors contributing to milk price volatility? 
 
 Domestic dairy policy. During the 1970s and 1980s the price support program had a large mitigating 
effect on milk price volatility. High support levels resulted in market prices for milk being close to 
support prices for most of the period. In addition, the government accumulated dairy products that 
could be released into the market to dampen prices when they rose far enough above the support 
level. As the level of dairy price supports was systematically cut in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
government inventories of dairy products were reduced and eventually eliminated. Lower support 
prices along with the absence of buffer stocks contributed to much of the increased volatility 
experienced in the late 1990s. Another policy-related factor likely underlying increasing milk price 
volatility is the lag in transmitting dairy product price changes to farm-level milk price changes because 
of the federal milk market order system minimum pricing provisions.     
 
 U.S. participation as a commercial exporter of dairy products. The ability for the U.S. to 
commercially export bulk dairy products in 2007 and 2008 played a crucial role in raising milk prices 
during this time. The loss of commercial exports in late 2008 and 2009 played an equally important role 
in lowering milk prices. The addition of new markets is thought to reduce risk and should therefore help 
decrease volatility. However, that does not happen when the ability to access these new markets is not 
consistent. 
 
 Increased concentration in milk production. As dairy herds have grown in size and more capital is 
invested in specialized dairy facilities, the ability to reduce milk production during times of low prices 
declines. The need to service debt means that idling these facilities is not usually an option; they 
usually remain in operation until their owner exits the business. Even then, the facilities often change 
owners and stay in milk production since few alternatives exist. The resulting effect of relatively more 
milk production than is justified by low milk prices acts to prolong and intensify periods of low prices, a 
factor in increased volatility.  
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Dairy Policy Brief #2: Dairy Product Price Support Program 
 
What is the Program? 
 
Dairy price supports have been a fixture of U.S. dairy policy since 1949. Price supports are a market 
intervention program, meaning that the government (USDA’s Commodity Credit Corporation or CCC) 
offers to purchase non-perishable dairy products (butter, cheese, and nonfat dry milk) from manufacturers 
at specified (intervention) prices. The program is dormant when market prices are above intervention 
prices. It is activated when the overall milk supply exceeds demand, causing excess milk to be diverted 
into production of nonperishable products and lowering their prices to levels that make sales to the CCC 
more profitable than commercial sales. Until 2008, product intervention prices were linked to a price 
support level for manufacturing milk that was set by Congress. The current Dairy Product Price Support 
Program (DPPSP) sets product prices, but not in reference to a minimum milk price. 
 
What are the issues? 
 
 Ineffective price floor. Using federal milk marketing order formulas, the current CCC purchase prices 
translate into Class III and Class IV milk prices of $9.00-$9.50 per hundredweight. This is well below the 
cost of producing milk given today’s high input costs. Moreover, dairy price supports have not always 
been successful in maintaining established floor prices for milk or dairy products. Because of non-
standard product, packaging, and payment specifications, it costs more to sell some products to the 
CCC than to commercial buyers. So market prices for these products, especially cheese, sometimes 
fall below intervention prices. This has led to a call by many dairy groups to raise the intervention prices 
to reflect the higher costs of selling to the CCC. Others have proposed that the milk price safety net be 
solidified by flooring the product prices used in federal milk marketing order pricing formulas at the 
intervention prices. Still others have proposed that the CCC place a standing bid on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) cash markets for cheese, butter and nonfat dry milk at the CCC purchase 
prices for these products.  
 
 Incompatibility with world trade liberalization. Dairy price supports have been a big contributor to 
the U.S. aggregate measure of support (AMS), which the World Trade Organization (WTO) uses to 
gauge trade-distorting domestic agricultural subsidies. The change in 2008 from supporting milk prices 
to supporting prices for dairy products should reduce the AMS attributable to the support program. 
Nevertheless, permitted AMS will very likely be reduced as part of ongoing WTO negotiations. Major 
changes in the DPPSP—or termination—may be necessary to conform to a new WTO agreement. The 
DPPSP has also been criticized for impeding growth in U.S. dairy exports. When low prices occur, U.S. 
dairy firms turn to the CCC and away from world markets. This tends to cast the United States as an 
unreliable supplier. 
 
 Market price distortions. Dairy price supports have affected milk utilization by setting a price floor for 
some products but not for others. The best example of this market distortion relates to nonfat dry milk, 
which is a source of dairy protein in many food applications. There is a large U.S. market for other 
dairy-based proteins, notably milk protein concentrate (MPC) and casein. Most MPC and all casein 
used in the U.S. come from imports. Because nonfat dry milk is purchased under the DPPSP, it is less 
risky and usually more profitable to produce nonfat dry milk than other forms of dairy proteins. Similarly, 
since the CCC purchases only cheddar cheese, more cheddar is likely produced at the expense of 
other cheese varieties, at least when cheese prices are low. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #3: Milk Income Loss Contract Program 
 
What is the Program? 
 
The Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program was initially authorized in the 2002 farm bill and extended 
with changes in the 2008 farm bill. The MILC program is a target price/deficiency payment program that 
makes direct payments to dairy producers when milk prices fall below the target price. The MILC target 
price is in reference to the Class I milk price at Boston. The minimum target is $16.94 per hundredweight, 
but the target is adjusted upward if estimated dairy feed costs are above a specified base level. All dairy 
producers are eligible to receive 45 percent of the difference between the adjusted target price and the 
actual Boston Class I price in any month that prices fall below the adjusted target.  This payment applies 
to all milk regardless of class use. However, MILC has an annual producer payment limit that is linked to 
production. Payments are restricted to the first 2.985 million pounds of milk marketed in any fiscal year 
(Oct. – Sept.). Marketings in months when no payments are made do not count against the cap, and 
producers may elect to ―start the clock‖ any month of the fiscal year.  
 
What are the issues? 
 
 Soft price floor. MILC does not create a floor on receipts, as the payment rate compensates for only 
part of the difference between the target and market Class I price. Other dairy target price/deficiency 
payment approaches that have been discussed generally propose a more solid price floor, but at a level 
that is lower than the target price set under the MILC program. 
 
 Production caps. The production cap feature of the MILC program has proven to be a very effective 
way to limit program payments compared to the dollar limits used in other commodity programs. But 
targeting of benefits to small dairy producers has made this program unpopular with larger dairy 
producers and areas of the country dominated by large dairies. Using the 2009 average U.S. milk yield 
of 20,576 pounds per cow, only dairy farms with fewer than 145 dairy cows are currently eligible to 
receive MILC payments on all milk sold. The U.S. average dairy herd size was 141 cows in 2009. As 
milk yields and dairy operation sizes grow, the percentage of annual U.S. milk production eligible for full 
MILC payments declines. Based on changes in the distribution of dairy operations by size, the amount 
of milk eligible for full MILC payments has fallen by more than 10 percent since the program was 
initiated in December 2001. 
 
 Milk supply impact. The MILC program tends to lengthen periods of low milk prices, since program 
payments supplement dairy income to keep some producers—especially smaller farmers—in business 
when they might otherwise have exited dairying. Raising the production cap would further lengthen 
periods of low prices. 
 
 Program costs. MILC program costs totaled $3.5 billion from inception through February 2010. The 
January 2010 Congressional Budget Office baseline estimates the cost at $159 million in FY 2010, $80 
million in FY2011 and $66 million in FY2012. Program expenditures in 2009 were about $900 million, 
much larger than expected when MILC was reauthorized (and modified) in the 2008 farm bill because 
of very low milk prices during most of 2009. Given the magnitude of the federal budget deficit and 
related cost-cutting efforts, the program could come under scrutiny if future outlays remain large. 
Moreover, MILC payments add dollar-for-dollar to the U.S. Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) under 
WTO rules, which could become an issue in negotiating AMS reductions within a new WTO agreement. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #4: Voluntary Supply Management 
 
What is the program? 
 
In the mid-1980s, Congress authorized two major voluntary dairy supply management programs, both 
funded in part through dairy farmer assessments. Under the 1984-85 Milk Diversion Program, dairy 
farmers who reduced their milk marketings 5 to 30 percent from a base level were paid $10 per 
hundredweight on the reduced marketings. This was followed in 1987 by the Dairy Termination Program 
(Whole Herd Buyout), under which the government accepted bids from dairy farmers who were willing to 
slaughter all female dairy cattle and remain out of the dairy business for at least 5 years. The Milk 
Diversion Program cut milk production sharply in 1985, but had no long-term effect. The whole herd 
buyout was more successful in moderating production trends, but the induced and concentrated slaughter 
of dairy cows negatively affected beef markets, raising the ire of cattle producers. 
 
The objective of these government-sponsored voluntary supply management programs was to enhance 
and stabilize farm-level milk prices by controlling the amount of milk marketed. Recently, an industry-
sponsored voluntary milk supply management program was initiated to achieve very similar objectives by 
using some of the same techniques. The program, labeled CWT for Cooperatives Working Together, was 
designed and is managed by the National Milk Producers Federation, a trade association of dairy 
cooperatives. Members of participating dairy cooperatives and, if they choose, independent dairy farmers 
fund the program through an assessment of ten cents per hundredweight on marketed milk. Currently, 
CWT has two methods of supply management: herd retirement and dairy export incentives. Under herd 
retirement, bids are accepted from dairy farmers who are willing to slaughter their current milking herd 
and perhaps dairy heifers. Export incentives provide participating cooperatives subsidies on exports of 
butter, anhydrous milkfat and cheese. 
 
What are the issues? 
 
 Adequate funding and participation. Government supply management programs are funded from 
mandatory producer assessments and/or federal appropriations. But funding for industry-sponsored 
programs like CWT depends on voluntary assessments. At issue is whether participation and the associated 
funds raised are sufficient to enhance and stabilize farm level milk prices over the long run. 
 
 Free riders. Voluntary supply management programs have a potential free rider problem—dairy farmers who 
don’t participate in the program still receive any benefits that result from the participation of others. Moreover, 
to the extent that voluntary supply management is successful, some dairy farmers are likely to respond to 
higher and more stable prices by expanding the size of their dairy herd. This makes it difficult for a voluntary 
program to be successfully increase milk prices over the long run. 
 
 Buying air. Voluntary supply management programs run the risk of buying air; that is, paying farmers to get 
out of the dairy business when they were already planning to retire. But there still may be benefits if the 
program requires milk cows to be slaughtered rather than sold to another dairy farmer. 
 
 Export market issues. The export incentive element of CWT not only moves dairy products from the 
domestic market, it can also provide valuable export experience for dairy cooperatives. However, since 
export subsidies are not offered continually, international customers may view participating dairy 
cooperatives as unreliable long-run sources of dairy products. There is also a question regarding whether 
CWT export subsidies fall under World Trade Organization rules. While they are not government subsidies, 
they could trigger a WTO trade inquiry if they become large. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #5: Mandatory Supply Control 
 
What is the Program? 
 
Quota and base programs specify the maximum amount of milk that individual dairy farmers can sell 
without incurring a penalty. Dairy farmers are assigned a strict marketing quota or a maximum level of 
marketings relative to an historical base. Economic penalties are applied to any sales in excess of the 
eligible marketings. The policy intent is to achieve a price goal by closely matching total milk supply with 
the total amount of milk demanded at the price objective.  
 
Milk quotas have been used for many years in Canada and the European Union (EU). Quotas have never 
been used directly for milk in the United States, but there were programs in the 1980s that used bases to 
assign penalties to dairy farmers who increased production. Depressed milk prices in 2009 have renewed 
interest in base programs. Several proposals have been developed with a common objective of 
preventing low milk prices and reducing price volatility by managing the growth in milk production to more 
closely match the growth in commercial sales. Dairy farmers who wish to increase milk production beyond 
their base and in excess of the growth in milk production deemed necessary to meet commercials sales 
are assessed a market access fee for a period of one year. After one year the dairy farmer’s base is 
increased to reflect the higher level of milk production. 
 
What are the issues? 
 
 Mandatory supply control can enhance farm milk prices without large government costs. Quotas and 
base plans do not require large treasury outlays because there are no government purchases or direct 
payments to farmers. The quota can be set at a level that achieves relatively high milk prices to farmers as 
evidenced by farm milk prices in Canada compared to those in the U.S. Base plans recently proposed are 
less restrictive than Canada’s quotas and as a result, may reduce milk price volatility but not provide as much 
price enhancement.  
 
 The value of marketing quotas/bases is capitalized and raises production costs. When quotas and 
bases succeed in stabilizing or raising prices above what they would be otherwise, the difference is 
capitalized into the value of the quota or base (if it is transferable) or the farm to which the base or quota is 
attached. In Canada and the EU, the cost of quota is a major investment for farmers who want to enter the 
industry or expand their operations. Bases that are less restrictive on expanding production and therefore 
less price enhancing would create less value than quotas, but  entry or expansion costs would still appear in 
either the purchase price of the base or the one year market access fee.  
 
 Quotas and bases interfere with efficient industry changes. Depending on how it is applied, mandatory 
supply control can impede or prevent structural change in the dairy industry. Quotas or bases that cannot be 
easily transferred can lock in herd size structure within regions and prevent inter-regional shifts in milk 
production that would increase industry efficiency. Programs that raise milk and dairy product prices 
significantly above those in other countries must be accompanied by high tariffs to keep out imports. This 
interferes with trade liberalization objectives. Similarly, sharply elevated prices run the risk of creating 
consumer resistance and encouraging the use of dairy substitutes.  
 
 Mandatory supply control can be difficult and expensive to administer. Dairy farmers need to be 
considered individually in allocating quotas/bases, and there can be difficult issues of equity in the allocation 
process. Individual farm production levels must be monitored to ensure compliance. Long-term milk supply 
and demand estimates must be made, which is a difficult and subjective process.  
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Dairy Policy Brief #6:  Dairy Farm Revenue Insurance  
 
What is the Program? 
 
With increased volatility in both feed costs and milk prices, there is increased dairy producer interest in 
government-sponsored and -subsidized gross margin (income over feed cost) insurance. A private dairy 
revenue insurance program already exists. Livestock Gross Margin for Dairy (LGM-Dairy) is a program 
administered by USDA’s Risk Management Agency. The program pays an indemnity at the end of the 
insurance period equal to the difference, if positive, between the gross margin expected at producer sign-
up and the gross margin actually experienced. The LGM-Dairy program contains no producer premium 
subsidies—it is self-financed in that the farm-specific premiums are set at the expected indemnity level. 
However, there is a direct payment made to insurance providers to cover administrative and overhead 
costs. LGM-Dairy uses futures and options prices to determine the expected gross margins that are used 
in the above indemnity calculation. Some of the elements of LGM-Dairy and experience with the program 
have relevance in the design of other government-administered dairy revenue insurance programs that 
might be considered. 
 
What are the Issues? 
 
 Level of Gross Margin Guarantee.  Depending on the level of gross margin guaranteed and market 
conditions, the premiums and thus program cost of a subsidized program could be significant. 
Moreover, given the substantial differences in feeding regimes across the U.S. and non-feed costs of 
production across farms of differing size, a ―one margin fits all‖ approach may not solve the income 
variability problems of a large number of producers. Under the LGM-Dairy program farm specific 
margins are able to be chosen to meet producer-specific needs and cost constraints. This increases 
flexibility but also increases administrative costs. 
 
 Determination of Expected and Actual Returns.  In designing gross revenue insurance, one of the 
more difficult aspects that must be addressed is how to calculate anticipated and actual milk revenue 
and feeds costs. How these values are determined affects the costs of the program and the degree to 
which the program is able to reduce dairy farm gross revenue variability for individual farms. 
 
 Insurance Contract Flexibility.  Producers differ in their risk management needs. These differences 
can be defined in terms of length of planning horizon, degree of risk accommodation and the ability to 
pay insurance premiums. In implementing any revenue insurance program there are tradeoffs between 
program flexibility and administrative ease. 
 
 Indemnity Period. Gross margin indemnity can cover monthly, quarterly or other insurance contract 
time periods. LGM-Dairy uses a 10-month indemnity period. Producers would prefer a monthly 
settlement rather than considering margins over several months. But monthly indemnity determination 
would significantly increase program administrative and premium costs given increased monthly risk. 
 
 Program Complexity. The LGM-Dairy program is considered complex by some, and has been 
criticized for being hard for producers to understand and use. Any broader subsidized program will 
likely suffer from the same criticism—gross margin insurance is a new concept and requires much more 
producer involvement than existing dairy programs like MILC. Consequently, a broadened program will 
need to be accompanied by an aggressive producer education effort to help ensure a successful 
outcome.
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Dairy Policy Brief #7: U.S. Dairy Trade Policy 
 
What Policies are in Place and Under Consideration? 
 
U.S. dairy trade is governed in large part by trade agreements approved by Congress. The broadest and 
most important agreement for dairy trade is the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA), which became effective in January 1995. The AoA was a landmark agreement for 
world agricultural trade, the first time that agriculture had been seriously considered in multilateral trade 
pacts. The AoA involves WTO member commitments in three areas: increasing market access, reducing 
export subsidies, and reducing domestic support programs that distort trade. WTO negotiations (the Doha 
Round) on an amended AoA with stronger member commitments within these three areas began in 2001 
but little progress has been made. The U.S. has also entered into many Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
that govern trade among a limited number of partners. Those most important to dairy are the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and bilateral agreements with Australia and Chile. 
 
What are the Issues? 
 
 Market Access. U.S. dairy exports have benefited from greater access to foreign markets with the AoA 
conversion of quotas and other non-tariff barriers to tariff rate quotas (TRQs). At the same time, 
complaints have been raised about the absence of a TRQ on milk protein concentrate (MPC). MPC 
enters the U.S. essentially duty-free and substitutes for nonfat dry milk, which is protected by a TRQ. A 
new Doha Round AoA will require the U.S. to expand access to its dairy markets, but it may also offer 
the opportunity to include MPC and other dairy proteins within its package of dairy products subject to 
TRQs. 
 
 Domestic support. The existing AoA and current Doha round negotiations include reductions in trade-
distorting domestic support levels, classified by the WTO as ―amber box‖ spending. This includes 
programs that ―couple‖ payments to farmers with current production or that set minimum prices to 
farmers that are higher than world market prices. The MILC program is an example of the former and 
the DPPSP is in the latter category. These dairy programs will come under scrutiny when WTO Doha 
Round negotiations resume and may need to be altered to meet U.S. commitments. 
 
 Export Subsidies. The AoA established reductions in the quantity and expenditure levels of subsidized 
agricultural exports. A new agreement will likely set a timeline for elimination of export subsidies. For 
the U.S. dairy industry, the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP) would need to be adjusted to be in 
compliance with export subsidy reductions made in a Doha round agreement. Current levels of dairy 
products that can be exported under the DEIP are:  butter and butteroil, 21,097 metric tons; skim milk 
powder, 68,201 metric tons; and cheese, 3,030 metric tons. These are very small limits relative to both 
U.S. production and subsidy limits for the EU. 
 
 Free Trade Agreements. Free trade agreements have proliferated in recent years, raising issues about 
whether they are substituting for the current AoA or reducing interest in negotiating a new AoA. The 
OECD estimates that more than a third of world trade is covered by existing FTAs and that including 
FTAs under consideration would raise that proportion to three-quarters. FTAs are a mixed bag for U.S. 
dairy. NAFTA has been a major benefit to U.S. dairy exports, with Mexico the largest market. The 
Australia FTA could potentially increase U.S. imports of dairy products, and a proposed FTA with New 
Zealand is being vigorously opposed by U.S. dairy producer interests. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #8a:  Federal Milk Marketing Orders  
 
What are federal milk marketing orders? 
 
Federal milk marketing orders (FMMOs) require regulated milk processors, called handlers, to pay 
minimum prices for milk and adhere to other specified rules. FMMOs are authorized under the Agricultural 
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended. Requests to initiate or amend an order generally come 
from producers, who also grant approval of proposals through a referendum. These requests usually 
come through dairy cooperatives representing producers. Upon producer approval (dairy cooperatives 
may bloc vote for their members), the Secretary issues the order, which is then binding on handlers within 
the affected marketing area; that is, handlers—not dairy producers—are regulated. The marketing area is 
a specified geographical region within which processors compete with each other for sales of fluid 
(beverage) milk to various retail and institutional outlets. The marketing area does not necessarily 
correspond to where producers shipping to these processors are located. 
 
There are 10 federal milk marketing orders, which regulated about 66 percent of 2009 U.S. milk 
marketings. California’s state order, which operates much like federal orders, accounted for another 21 
percent in 2009. The remainder is priced under other state orders or is not subject to FMMO regulation. 
 
According to the USDA, the major objectives of FMMOs are to: (1) assure consumers of an adequate 
supply of wholesome milk at a reasonable price; and (2) to avoid unreasonable fluctuations in supplies 
and prices. 
 
What are the Issues? 
 
The objectives of FMMOs are achieved through classified pricing, pooling, and setting minimum producer 
pay prices. There are a number of controversial issues related to how these methods are employed. 
These are discussed in Dairy Policy Briefs 8b – 8d. Briefly: 
 
 Classified Pricing. Classified pricing establishes monthly minimum pay prices for milk and milk 
components according to the dairy products they are used to produce. Minimum prices for some 
classes of milk are derived through product price formulas that tie milk prices to market prices for 
products within the class. Order prices for other classes of milk are not related directly to markets for 
the products included in the class. 
 
 Pooling. Pooling is accomplished under federal orders by obligating each regulated handler in the 
marketing area to account for milk receipts according to usage by class. Handlers pay into or draw from 
a producer settlement fund depending on the order-determined value of their milk receipts priced at 
order minimum prices relative to the market-wide average value (uniform price).  
 
 Minimum Prices. Federal orders guarantee producers a minimum price for their milk that is an average 
of the minimum class prices weighted by the proportion of milk used in each class. Within marketing 
orders, the producer price is the same (for milk of equal quality) regardless of the class of products that 
are made from the producer’s milk. In six of the ten FMMOs, producers are paid for pounds of milk 
components (butterfat, protein and other solids), not for pounds of milk. In the other four orders, 
producers are paid for their deliveries of skim milk and butterfat. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #8b: Federal Milk Marketing Orders—Classification 
 
What is the Program? 
 
Federal milk marketing orders define classes of milk according to end use and set minimum processor 
prices for each class. Each of the 10 orders uniformly defines four use classes: Class I consists of all 
forms of beverage milk; Class II is perishable manufactured products like cottage cheese, yogurt, and ice 
cream; Class III is hard cheeses; and Class IV is butter and nonfat dry milk. Class prices are announced 
monthly and apply to milk deliveries for the entire month. 
 
In general, Class I prices are considerably higher than prices for the other three classes. The Class I price 
is set by adding a differential to manufacturing class prices. This Class I Differential is the same each 
month, but ranges both within and among FMMO markets from $1.60 per hundredweight (Upper Midwest 
order, Grafton, ND) to $6.00 (Florida order, Miami). Producer prices, which depend on class prices and 
usage within classes, are positively related to Class I prices and Class I utilization. Class I utilization 
varies substantially across orders, from less than 20 percent in the Upper Midwest to more than 80 
percent in Florida, and also seasonally within orders. 
 
Classified pricing is an application of price discrimination. The price elasticity of demand for dairy products 
differs among classes. Consequently, producer revenue can be enhanced by shifting milk away from 
products with a relatively inelastic demand (e.g., fluid milk) into products with a relatively elastic demand 
(e.g., cheese). 
 
What are the issues? 
 
 Determining the right class. USDA has a comprehensive system for determining how dairy products 
are assigned to milk classes. For most dairy products, the classification is straightforward. But 
classification is not always clear for dairy products that are a complex combination of milk components, 
sometimes in combination with non-dairy ingredients. For example, some new dairy-based beverages 
have been configured in a way that puts them in Class II instead of Class I, which covers other fluid milk 
products. Producers argued that this caused them to lose the higher Class I value to the extent these 
beverage products compete with other fluid milk. Producers of these new beverages argued that they 
were expanding total dairy sales to the benefit of producers and that pricing their dairy ingredients at 
Class I would make the products uncompetitive. 
 
 How many classes?  Are four classes too many?  Not enough?  Some have argued that there should 
be more classes to accommodate new products and to promote export sales. Others have argued that 
―fine tuning‖ classification in response to new products is a lost cause, and that the system should be 
simplified by having only two classes—fluid milk products and all manufactured dairy products.   
 
 Changing price elasticities. Enhancing producer revenue through price discrimination/classified 
pricing requires knowledge of relative elasticities. Past research has consistently shown that the price 
elasticity of demand at retail for fluid milk is smaller in absolute value (more inelastic) than demand for 
manufactured products. This supports a relatively high price for milk used in fluid products. But the 
rapid growth in cheese consumption, especially in food ingredient and flavoring uses has made cheese 
demand more inelastic over time. At the same time, fluid milk is facing more substitutes today and there 
are more and more varied fluid products, causing demand to become more elastic. This raises the 
question of whether class prices are properly aligned. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #8c: Federal Milk Marketing Orders—Pricing 
 
What is the Program? 
 
Federal orders set minimum class prices using a set of formulas. For Class III and Class IV prices, 
formulas link milk component values directly to wholesale prices for the major dairy products within the 
classes. For example, the Class III (and Class IV) butterfat formula derives a butterfat price by subtracting 
a make allowance (assumed manufacturing margin) from the wholesale price of butter and multiplying the 
difference by the assumed yield of butter per pound of butterfat. Protein, nonfat solids, and other solids 
prices are derived in a similar manner, with the values of these components linked to wholesale prices for 
cheese/butter, nonfat dry milk, and dry whey, respectively. The Class III and Class IV prices per 
hundredweight are calculated by multiplying component prices by the pounds of component assumed to 
be contained in a ―standard‖ hundredweight of milk. Class I and Class II federal order milk prices are not 
tied to the wholesale prices of Class I and Class II dairy products. Rather, these prices are set by adding 
a differential to Class III and Class IV prices. Consequently, prices for all classes of milk are related 
directly to wholesale prices for butter, cheese, dry whey, and nonfat dry milk. 
 
What are the issues? 
 
 Product price formulas. The product price formulas for Class III and Class IV contain values for 
manufacturing costs and yields that are based on industry experience. Costs and yields vary among 
plants, raising the question of where to draw the line—should the values assure profitability for all 
plants? Only the most efficient plants? The formula values can become outdated over time, leading to 
abnormally high or low plant operating revenue. This is a particularly serious problem for make 
allowances. For example, rapidly rising fuel and energy prices in 2005 and 2006 elevated 
manufacturing costs increasingly above the formula make allowances. But raising product prices in an 
attempt to offset higher manufacturing costs translates directly into higher milk costs through the Class 
III and Class IV formulas, leaving manufacturers no better off. And altering make allowances requires a 
lengthy administrative process during which conditions could change radically. Product price formulas 
rely on wholesale prices for dairy products that are collected and reported by USDA’s National 
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). While reporting is mandatory, NASS only requires reporting of 
prices for ―spot market‖ sales, which represent less than 20 percent of butter production and less than 
40 percent of cheese production. Moreover, because prices for most butter and cheese transactions 
are pegged to the thinly-traded Chicago Mercantile Exchange markets, even spot market sales prices 
may not consistently reflect broad supply and demand conditions. 
 
 Class I prices. Minimum Class II, III and IV prices are the same across all orders. But while the base is 
the same, minimum Class I prices differ because Class I differentials vary across markets. The spread 
in Class I differentials is from $1.60 to $6.00 per hundredweight. Class I differentials are positively 
correlated with Class I utilization and, for markets east of the Rocky Mountains, distance from the 
Upper Midwest. The logic for these differences was to encourage local self-sufficiency in fluid milk to 
avoid costly shipments of inferior milk to meet deficit needs. But with rapid transportation and modern 
packaging technologies, packaged milk can economically move long distances with little or no 
deterioration in quality. This has reduced the need for widely-varying Class I prices which some 
currently suggest contributes to the inefficient location of milk production. Another issue is the advance 
pricing of Class I. Class I prices are announced before the month to which they apply while Class III 
and IV prices are announced after the month to which they apply. This can result in ―price inversion‖ 
with Class I priced under Class III and IV, disrupting incentives for plants to meet fluid milk needs. 
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Dairy Policy Brief #8d: Federal Milk Marketing Orders—Pooling 
 
What is the Program? 
 
Under federal milk marketing orders, producer milk value is determined through pooling. Simplifying what 
is a complex process, total pool value is calculated by applying minimum class prices to the volume of 
milk used in each of the four classes, I through IV. Producers affiliated with handlers regulated under the 
order are paid a common price for milk that is equivalent to total pool value divided by total pool volume, 
regardless of how their milk is used.  
 
The terms, pool and pooled, are also used in federal order language to refer to plants that either must or 
may be part of the overall pooling process and to producers eligible to share in the pool distribution. Class 
I handlers within an order marketing area are called pool distributing plants. These plants are required to 
be pooled, that is, they are obligated to pay minimum Class I prices for the milk they receive. For 
manufacturing plants, called pool supply plants, pooling is optional. But there is usually an economic 
incentive for doing so because they receive producer settlement fund payments to pay producers. 
 
Producers may ship their milk to any handler and share in the marketing order pool under which the 
receiving handler is regulated. Dairy cooperatives sometimes ―pool‖ some of their affiliated producers on 
distant markets to take advantage of higher producer pay prices. 
 
What are the issues? 
 
 Distant pooling. In six out of ten federal orders, producers receive Class III milk component prices for 
their butterfat, protein and other solids plus a producer price differential (PPD) per hundredweight of 
milk. The PPD represents the market-wide combined marginal value of other classes of milk relative to 
Class III, and varies positively across markets with Class I prices and utilization. When cooperatives 
pool producers’ milk outside the producers’ marketing area, all of the pooled milk receives the PPD for 
the receiving market. But not all the milk that is pooled has to be shipped to receive the PPD—the 
shipper need only demonstrate the capability of providing the pooled milk as defined by the receiving 
market’s order qualification standards. Consequently, there has been a strong incentive to pool milk on 
markets with a relatively high PPD, which increases the volume of pooled milk and decreases the 
average pool value in the receiving order. Several orders have recently amended operating rules to 
tighten qualification standards in order to reduce economic incentives for distant pooling. 
 
 Depooling. Because Class I prices are announced six weeks before Class III prices, the monthly Class III 
price has infrequently ended up higher than the Class I price during periods of rapidly rising prices. This price 
inversion means that the PPD becomes negative and that pooled Class III handlers, who normally draw 
money from an order’s producer settlement fund, would have to pay into the fund. To avoid this payment, 
Class III handlers often depool—disassociate from the order—when there is a price inversion. The effect of 
depooling is to remove higher-priced milk from the pool, further reducing the PPD. Some orders have been 
and are being amended to make it more difficult for plants to depool. 
 
 Producer-handlers. Dairy farmers who package and sell fluid milk exclusively from their own herds are 
exempt from federal order regulations. There are only a few producer-handlers and most have small herds 
and limited fluid milk sales. But some exempt producer-handlers have grown large enough to materially 
reduce Class I sales of regulated handlers. This reduces marketing order pool dollars and average milk value 
to producers shipping milk to pool plants. In March 2010, USDA issued a final rule amending orders so that 
only farms with bottled milk sales of three million pounds or less per month remain exempt from the pooling 
provisions of federal orders. 
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